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PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY

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OUR RELATIONS WITH THE INSURGENTS  
PRIOR TO THE FALL OF MANILA.

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WERE PROMISES MADE?

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FIRST SERIES.

IV.

January 28, 1901.

This pamphlet may be obtained  
by application to L. K. Fuller,  
12 Otis Place, Boston, Mass.

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*Philippine Information*

*Society*



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**T**HE Philippine Information Society is preparing a series of publications in pursuance of the purpose for which the Society was formed, that namely of placing within reach of the American people the most reliable and authoritative evidence attainable in regard to the people of the Philippine Islands and our relations to them.

The whole of the evidence, even the whole of the official evidence, is more voluminous than a busy people can be expected to read. Some selection on our part has, therefore, been a necessary condition of the accomplishing of our object. This selection by us, has, however, been confined so far as possible, to the choosing of subjects to be dealt with. Upon each subject chosen we have given in some cases all the evidence obtainable, in all other cases as much of the authoritative and important evidence as is possible within reasonable limits, with ample references to the remainder.

If those of whatever shade of opinion who find our mediation unsatisfactory, or who are not convinced of our success in getting the whole story, will appeal from us to the original sources of information, our object of promoting a knowledge of the facts will be only the more effectively secured. We shall be grateful for any criticism or information convicting us of the omission of any important evidence, or of any appearance of unfairness in the presentation of evidence, and will endeavor to profit thereby in future editions.

The subject of the present series of papers has seemed to us as important as any that could be selected. It comprises the principal episodes in the history of our relation to the Filipinos, chiefly as that history is contained in our state papers. We have been careful to include the evidence which tells of the Filipinos' share in that history, as well as our own. Whatever view one may hold as to the proper policy for us to pursue toward the Filipinos, it is evident that no policy can be intelligently chosen nor successfully carried out unless it is based upon an understanding of these people, and of their present attitude toward us, and toward the question of our relation to them. It is hoped that the account we shall offer may prove a help toward an understanding of the present situation.

# THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY.

OUTLINE OF FIRST SERIES.

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## THE STORY OF THE FILIPINOS,

AS TOLD IN UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS AND OTHER AUTHENTIC PUBLICATIONS.

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I. José Rizal, the Filipino Patriot: together with an account of the Insurgent Movement of 1896.

II. Aguinaldo: a Selection from his Official Documents, together with the Authorized Accounts of the alleged "Spanish Bribe."

III. The Insurgent Government of 1898.

IV. Our Relations with the Insurgents prior to the Fall of Manila, August, 1898.

V. Aguinaldo and the American Generals, August, 1898, to January, 1899.

VI. Iloilo: An Episode of January, 1899, and Incidents leading up to the Outbreak of Hostilities.

VII. Outbreak of Hostilities February 4, 1899.

VIII. Efforts to secure an Armistice, April and May, 1899.

IX. Efforts at Recognition, October and November, 1899.

X. Present Condition and Attitude.

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NOTE. It will be impossible to bring out the circulars in their chronological order owing to the difficulty and delay in securing certain of the necessary official documents, some of which, indeed, are not yet in our hands. Every effort will be made, however, consistent with thoroughness and accuracy to issue them as soon as possible.

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## OUR RELATIONS WITH THE INSURGENTS PRIOR TO THE FALL OF MANILA, AUGUST, 1898.

The object of this pamphlet is to present the officially reported evidence with regard to the often repeated assertion that the United States Government, through its representatives, recognized Aguinaldo's government and thus bound the United States to grant independence to the Filipinos. It may as well be stated at once that the editors have found no direct evidence which seems to them to bear out this assertion. In order, however, that readers may determine for themselves the extent of our obligations to the Filipino people, all the accessible evidence on the subject is here submitted. To explain the general situation, first, quotations are given from two articles, one by a British traveller of wide experience, the other by an officer of the United States Army; then follow quotations from the only consular and military officers of our government who had such direct official or personal relations with Aguinaldo as would have made it possible for them to recognize his government or to convey any promises to him. No other officials, besides those from whom we quote, have been, so far as we know, charged with making any pledge or alliance. It should be noted that extracts from the documents given below have been used as a basis for the assertion that pledges were made.

[NOTE — The "Senate Documents" quoted in this pamphlet are referred to by number only. Their official titles are as follows:—

SENATE DOCUMENT 62, 55th Congress, 3d session. The Treaty of Paris and accompanying papers. Ordered printed Jan. 13, 1899.

SENATE DOCUMENT 208, 56th Congress, 1st session. Communications between the Executive Departments of the Government and Aguinaldo, etc. Ordered printed March 5, 1900.

SENATE DOCUMENT 387, 56th Congress, 1st session. Cable Dispatches from General Otis, etc. Ordered printed May 21, 1900.]

### INTRODUCTORY SUMMARIES.

[NATIONAL REVIEW, SEPTEMBER, 1900, PAGE 52.]

From "*Will the United States withdraw from the Philippines?*" by JOHN FOREMAN, F. R. G. S., etc.

[NOTE. — John Foreman is the author of a book on the Philippine Islands more quoted, perhaps, than any other work on the subject with the exception of Professor Worcester's. He testified before the Peace Commission at Paris, in August, 1898.]

"Through the intermediary of certain American officials in the far eastern posts, Emilio Aguinaldo, the supreme rebel chief, came under the notice of Admiral (then Commodore) Dewey, and under a verbal

agreement with this officer, Aguinaldo and his staff were conveyed from Chinese waters in an American warship and landed at Cavite. Aguinaldo and his inexperienced followers were so completely carried away by the humanitarian avowals of the greatest republic the world had seen that they willingly consented to co-operate with the Americans on mere verbal promises, instead of a written agreement which could be held binding on the United States Government. America, at that time, had no definite policy regarding the Philippines. In the numerous proclamations and political utterances high-sounding phrases, such as 'the cause of civilization' and 'for the sake of humanity' were freely used, and, relying upon the assurances of irresponsible politicians, the Filipinos, under Aguinaldo, regarded themselves as allies and Spain's foes.

"What Washington might hereafter decide anent the Philippines was not the naval and military commanders' concern. They had before them solely the task of destroying the Spanish fleet and taking Manila. In the accomplishment of the first part of their program, the attitude of the natives was of little consequence, but, although Manila might have been forthwith reduced to ruins by bombardment, a military occupation of the wrecked capital would have been an extremely difficult and bloody enterprise if the natives had thrown their lot with the Spaniards. The neutrality of the natives was out of the question. Thirty thousand Filipinos were already under arms, fighting or ready to fight, for the cause of liberty, and their chiefs were beguiled into the belief that the Americans had come to aid them in that cause. The American commanders in fact never intended to do more than utilize Aguinaldo's prestige with the natives to check possible excesses and avert anarchy, pending the contest with the Spaniards. If the American commanders had frankly undeceived Aguinaldo and his staff great complications would have arisen in consequence, for the Filipinos in rebellion against the Spaniards (and thousands of others) would either have temporarily joined their old masters against the common enemy, or they would have at once formed an independent third party in the conflict. There can be no doubt on this point, because Pedro Paterno, the very man who afterwards became president of the first native congress, strongly urged them in a public manifesto, to oppose the Americans' landing, on the grounds that, otherwise, they would fall under the American yoke. But in the rebel camp they would not believe it. The leading Filipinos in arms seem to have been more influenced in their appreciation of American intentions by the persuasive language of United States officials who had no authority to speak in the name of their Government, than they were by the commanders' overt acts which, to shrewder minds, would have belied the idea of alliance or partnership.

or instance, the Filipinos were ordered not to attempt to take Manila by assault, to haul down their republican flag in the bay, to evacuate one point after another, to give up their trenches to the American troops, to abstain from co-operating against the Spaniards the day Manila was taken, and (under threat of force) to remove their outposts farther and farther away from the city. When Manila, which they themselves might have captured, fell into the hands of their so-called allies, the gates were closed against them. The 'Philippine Republic' proclaimed by Aguinaldo held its congress at Malolos (in the province of Bulacan, a few miles from Manila), a ministry was formed, laws were passed, taxes were collected, local presidents were appointed in the provinces, and decrees were issued, but the whole proceedings as well as the existence of the titular native government were ignored by the Americans. But notwithstanding these and many other snubs, they still clung, during five months (between August, 1898, and February, 1899), to the vain delusion that their independence would be secured through the medium of American intervention. It was merely a hope in which they received repeated encouragement from several United States officials in the far East, but, in reality, at no time up to the present has there existed any formal and binding compact between the titular Philippine Republic (or Philippine representatives) and the Republic of the United States."

[NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, FEBRUARY, 1900, PAGE 275.]

*From "Our Rule in the Philippines," by Brig.-Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. A., late Major-General, U. S. V., in command of the First Expeditionary Land Force from the United States to the Philippine Islands.*

"At that time [July, 1898] the insurgent Filipinos had driven the Spanish soldiers within the defences of Manila, and had them completely invested on the land side by light field works, which they held with about fourteen thousand men. They were poorly armed and equipped, yet, as they had defeated the Spaniards in a number of fights in the field, and had taken four thousand prisoners, it may be asserted in the vernacular of the camp that they 'had the morale on them.' The Manila garrison was so demoralized at that time and so incomplete was their line of defence that I believe it would have been possible, by coming to an understanding with Aguinaldo, to have carried their advance works by storm and to have captured all of the city, except the walled city or the old Spanish town. Under existing orders we could not have struck a bargain with the Filipinos, as our Government did not recognize the authority of Aguinaldo as constituting a *de facto*

government; and, if Manila had been taken with his co-operation, it would have been his capture as much as ours. We could not have held so large a city with so small a force, and, it would, therefore, have been practically under Filipino control.

“On the 1st of July, 1898, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked me at once whether ‘The United States of the North’ either had recognized or would recognize his government — I am not quite sure as to the form of his question, whether it was ‘had’ or ‘would.’ In either form it was embarrassing. My orders were, in substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go beyond the zone of naval co-operation, to consult Admiral Dewey, and to wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his government only a few days before (June 28), and Admiral Dewey had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the situation, then, I believe to be these: Consul Williams states in one of his letters to the State Department that several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number, yet I believe that statement has foundation in fact. Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than their statements. If an incipient rebellion was already in progress, what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at his request. They were permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had thrown into the bay; and, with four thousand rifles taken from Spanish prisoners and two thousand purchased in Hongkong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had no reason to surmise. But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo.

“I told him I was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no authority to recognize his government; that we had come to whip the Spaniards and that, if we were successful, the indirect result would be to free them from Spanish tyranny. I added that as we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped we would get along amicably together. He did not seem pleased with this answer. The fact is he hoped and expected to take Manila with Admiral Dewey’s assistance, and he was bitterly disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite.”

[PAGE 277.]

“A few days thereafter, he made an official call, coming with cabinet and staff and a band of music. On that occasion he handed me an elaborate schedule for an autonomous government which he had received from some Filipinos in Manila, with a statement that they had reason to believe that Spain would grant them such a form of government. With this was an open letter addressed to the Filipino people from Pedro Alexandre Paterno, advising them to put their trust in Spain rather than América. The day before, two German officers had called on Aguinaldo, and I believed they had brought him these papers. I asked him if the scheme was agreeable to him. He did not answer but asked if we, the North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that, but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: ‘I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no authority for colonies and I have no fear.’

“It may seem that my answer was somewhat evasive, but I was at the time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, carts, fuel, and forage. We soon found that Aguinaldo had forbidden his people to sell us anything without his permission. We then informed him that we would have to resort to requisitions. This brought him to terms, and he sent his brother-in-law to us with the assurance that he would give us all possible assistance in obtaining supplies. The depot quartermaster then employed the brother-in-law, and after that we had no further trouble on that score.

“The prevailing sentiment of the Filipinos toward us can be shown by one incident:—

“About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in Cavite invited a number of our army and navy officers to a banquet. There was some postprandial speech-making, the substance of the Filipino talk being that they wished to be annexed, but not conquered. One of our officers in reply assured them that we had not come to make them slaves, but to make them free men. A singular scene followed. All the Filipinos rose to their feet, and Buencameno, taking his wine-glass in his hand, said: ‘We wish to be baptized in that sentiment.’ Then he and the rest poured the wine from their glasses over their heads.”

## I. CONSULAR CORRESPONDENCE.

[NOTE.—The consular letters are put first, not because they are the most important part of the evidence, but because upon them is oftenest based the assertion that promises were made to Aguinaldo. Indeed, on the question of the importance of these letters it is well to bear in mind the words of Senator Lodge (page 21 of his speech of March 7, 1900):—

“That loosely-written and wholly unauthorized letters were sent him [Aguinaldo] by some of our consuls I well know, but when or by what code of international law, or where in the Constitution or the laws of the United States is it set down that the letter of a consul, who is not a diplomatic officer, and has no authority to speak for his government, constitutes a recognition of another government?”

The letters, referred to by Senator Lodge, written by the consuls to Aguinaldo, are not given below, as these letters are inaccessible to us. We quote the letters sent to Washington by the consuls, reporting their negotiations with Aguinaldo. It will be noticed that each one asserts that he has made no pledges.]

## 1. CORRESPONDENCE OF E. SPENCER PRATT, U. S. CONSUL AT SINGAPORE.

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 341-346.]

*Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

“ [Confidential.] ”

“ No. 212. ] ”

“ CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

“ *Singapore, April 28, 1898.*

“ SIR,—I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th instant, and confirmed in my dispatch No. 211 of that date, a telegram, which, deciphered, read as follows:—

“ SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington:*

“ General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey co-operation insurgents Manila. PRATT.

“ The facts are these: On the evening of Saturday, the 23d instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here, incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. H. W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who, after fifteen years' residence as a merchant and a planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish misrule, to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom I had previously obtained much valuable infor-

mation for Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the islands.

"Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the 24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present the General's trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as interpreter.

"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of and the object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, to point out the damage of continuing independent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expediency of co-operation with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day, as follows, through our consulate-general at Hongkong:—

"Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong; arrange with Commodore for general co-operation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph. PRATT.

"The Commodore's reply reading thus:

"Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible. DEWEY.

"I received it late that night, and at once communicated to General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by British steamer *Malacca*, which left here on Tuesday, the 26th.

"Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall give you by next mail.

"The General impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the confidence that has been placed in him.

"I think that in arranging for his direct co-operation with the commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

"If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval, as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I consider there is due some special recognition for most valuable services rendered.

"How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to decide.

"I have, etc.

E. SPENCER PRATT,  
"United States Consul-General."

*Consul Pratt to Mr. Day, Secretary of State.*

“No. 213.] CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*Singapore, April 30, 1898.*

“SIR,—Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant, I have the honor to report that in the second and last interview I had with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commodore Dewey’s direction, of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American Government, the President having declared that the present hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principles of civilized warfare.

“To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should direct.”

“The General further stated that he hoped the United States would assume Protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would desire American advice and assistance.

“These questions I have told him I have no authority to discuss.

“I have, etc.,

E. SPENCER PRATT,

“*United States Consul-General.*”

*Consul Pratt to Mr. Day, Secretary of State.*

“No. 217.] CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
*Singapore, May 5, 1898.*

“SIR,—I regret to have to report that the circumstances attending the departure from here of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo to join Commodore Dewey, which I have endeavored so hard to prevent from being disclosed, were, in substance, made public in yesterday’s edition of the Singapore Free Press, from the enclosed copy of which you will note, by reference to my reports Nos. 212 and 213, of the 28th and 30th, ultimo, respectively, that though the facts are in the main correctly given, the dates are not quite accurate, and a certain amount of conjecture has been indulged in as regards my action in the matter and that of the commodore.

“Almost immediately after the occurrence the editor of the above journal told me that he had been informed but declined to say by whom.

“I endeavored to get him to promise to keep the whole affair quiet, but, though he would not agree to this, he gave me his word not to mention it until after sufficient time should have elapsed to admit of



Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo's reaching Hongkong, which he must already have done.

"Hence no harm can come of the disclosure, and, though it is annoying, I suppose I should rather congratulate myself that the secret possessed by such a number was kept for so long.

"I have, etc.,

E. SPENCER PRATT,

*"United States Consul-General."*

"[Inclosure. — The Singapore Free Press, Wednesday,  
May 4, 1898.]

"THE WAR — IMPORTANT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT — AGUINALDO IN SINGAPORE — AN INCOGNITO VISIT — HE JOINS ADMIRAL DEWEY — PLAN CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CONSUL-GENERAL.

"Just before the actual outbreak of hostilities between Spain and the United States Singapore has been the scene of a secret political arrangement by which Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo y Fami, the supreme head of the revolutionary movement in the Philippines, has entered into direct relations with Admiral Dewey, commander of the American squadron in China waters, while that officer was still at Hongkong.

"In order to understand and appreciate this interesting historical incident properly, it will be necessary to allude to the causes leading to the second appearance of the rebellion in the Philippines, which was almost coincident with, though not instigated by, the strained relations between Spain and the United States.

"In December last, Gen. Primo de Rivera, who above all other Spanish generals has an intimate knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, found the position untenable for both parties. Neither of these had the remotest chance of terminating the rebellion decisively, the rebels secure in their mountain fastnesses, the Spaniards holding the chief towns and villages on the coast. Primo de Rivera therefore sent two well-known Philippine natives, occupying high positions in Manila, to propose terms of Peace to General Aguinaldo in Biac-na-Bato. A council of the revolutionary government was held, in which it was agreed to lay down arms on condition of certain reforms being introduced. The principal of these were: —

"1. The expulsion, or at least secularization, of the religious orders, and the inhibition of these orders from all official vetoes in civil administration.

"2. A general amnesty for all rebels, and guarantees for their personal security and from the vengeance of the friars and parish priests after returning to their homes.

"3. Radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration.

“4. Freedom of the press to denounce official corruption and blackmailing.

“5. Representation in the Spanish Parliament.

“6. Abolition of the iniquitous system of secret deportation of political suspects, etc.

“Primo de Rivera agreed to these reforms in sum and substance, but made it a condition that the principal rebel leaders must leave the country during His Majesty’s pleasure. As these had lost all their property or had had it confiscated and plundered, the Government agreed to provide them with funds to live in a becoming manner on foreign soil.

“The rebels laid down their arms and peace was apparently secured, but no sooner had they done so and returned to their houses than the *intransigent* religious orders commenced at once to again persecute them and trump up imaginary charges to procure their rearrest. The Spanish Government, on its side, imagining itself secure, desisted from carrying out the promised reforms, thinking another trick like that played on the Cubans after the peace of Zanjón, arranged by Martínez Campos, might succeed. The Filipinos, however, with this business before them, refused to be made dupes of, and have taken up arms again, not alone in the immediate districts round Manila but throughout the Archipelago, which merely awaits the signal from General Aguinaldo to rise *en masse*, no doubt carrying with them the native troops hitherto loyal, and for which loyal service they have received no thanks but only ingratitude.

“Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Col. Marcelo H. del Pilar, and his private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba, arrived incognito in Singapore from Saigon on April 21, 1898. In Saigon, where Aguinaldo had remained for one week, he had interviews with one or two old Filipino friends now resident there. The special purpose of Aguinaldo’s visit to Singapore was to consult other friends here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray, an old and intimate English friend, for fifteen years resident in the Philippines, about the state of affairs in the islands generally — particularly as to the possibility of war between the United States and Spain, and whether, in such an event, the United States would eventually recognize the independence of the Philippines, provided he lent his co-operation to the Americans in the conquest of the country. The situation of the moment was this, that the conditions of the honorable peace concluded on December 14, 1897, between President Aguinaldo, on behalf of the Philippine rebels, and H. E. Governor-General Primo de Rivera, on behalf of Spain, had not been carried out, although their immediate execution had been vouched for in that agreement.

“These reforms would have provided protection to the people

against the organized oppression and rapacity of the religious fraternities, would have secured improved civil and criminal procedure in courts, and have guaranteed, in many ways, improvements in the fiscal and social conditions of the people. The repudiation by the Spanish government of these conditions, made by Gen. Primo de Rivera, now left the rebel leaders, who had for the most part gone to Hongkong, free to act. And it was in pursuance of that freedom of action that Aguinaldo again sought counsel of his friends in Saigon and Singapore, with a view to the immediate resumption of operations in the Philippines.

“ Meantime, Mr. Bray, whose assistance to this journal on matters connected with the Philippines has been very considerable, as our readers will have seen, was introduced by the editor of the Singapore Free Press to Mr. Spencer Pratt, consul-general of the United States, who was anxious, in view of contingencies, to learn as much as possible about the real condition of the Philippines. It was a few days after this that Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore, when he at once met his friends, including Mr. Bray.

“ Affairs now becoming more warlike, Mr. Bray, after conversation with Mr. Spencer Pratt, eventually arranged an interview between that gentleman and General Aguinaldo, which took place late on the evening of Sunday, the 24th April, at ‘The Mansion,’ River Valley road. There were present on that occasion Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo y Fami; Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general United States of America; Mr. Howard W. Bray, Aguinaldo’s private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba; Col. M. H. del Pilar, and Dr. Marcelino Santos.

“ During this conference, at which Mr. Bray acted as interpreter, General Aguinaldo explained to the American consul-general, Mr. Pratt; the incidents and objects of the late rebellion, and described the present disturbed state of the country. General Aguinaldo then proceeded to detail the nature of the co-operation he could give, in which he, in the event of the American forces from the squadron landing and taking possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order and discipline amongst the native troops and inhabitants in the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenceless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare. He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles, and would be willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United States intends giving to Cuba.

“ The consul-general of the United States, coinciding with the general views expressed during the discussion, placed himself at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral Dewey at Hongkong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent interchange of telegrams consequently took place.

“As a result, another private interview was arranged at the American consular residence at the Raffles Hotel between General Aguinaldo, Mr. Spencer Pratt, Mr. Howard Bray, and Mr. Leyba, private secretary to General Aguinaldo.

“As a sequel to this interview, and in response to the urgent request of Admiral Dewey, General Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong by the first available steamer, the Peninsular and Oriental *Malacca*, on Tuesday, the 26th April, at noon, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain del Pilar, and Mr. Leyba, his private secretary.

“The only interview or conversation with any strangers that General Aguinaldo had during his stay in Singapore, other than the above interviews was during a visit paid by General Aguinaldo to Mr. W. G. St. Clair, editor of the Singapore Free Press, at the office of this journal. On that occasion General Aguinaldo was accompanied by Mr. Bray and Mr. Leyba.

“Throughout the whole stay of General Aguinaldo in Singapore the editor was kept fully informed daily of the progress of affairs. Naturally, however, all statement of what occurred has been withheld by us until what has been deemed the fitting moment has arrived.

“The substance of the whole incident in its relations to the recent course of affairs in the Philippines has been very fully telegraphed by the editor, both to New York and London.

“The influence of the incident on the future of the Philippines may prove to be of a far reaching historical character.

#### “AGUINALDO’S POLICY.

“General Aguinaldo’s policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrial population of the country. There would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judiciary of the country under experienced European law officers. Entire freedom of the press would be established, as well as the right of public meeting. There would be general religious toleration, and steps would be taken for the abolition and expulsion of the tyrannical religious fraternities who have laid such strong hands on every branch of civil administration. Full provision would be given for the exploitation of the natural resources and wealth of the country by roads and railways, and by the removal of hindrances to enterprise and investment of capital. Spanish officials would be removed to a

place of safety until opportunity offered to return them to Spain. The preservation of public safety and order, and the checking of reprisals against Spaniards would, naturally, have to be a first care of the government in the new state of things."

*Consul Pratt to Mr. Day, Secretary of State.*

"No. 223.] CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
" *Singapore, May 20, 1898.*

"SIR: I have the honor to submit for your consideration a proclamation in Spanish, issued prior to the departure of our fleet for Manila by the insurgent leaders in Hongkong, calling upon the Filipinos not to obey the appeal of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans, but to rally in support of these, as they came as their friends and liberators.

"Three copies of the English translation of the above I also inclose for handing to the press, should that, in your opinion, seem advisable.

"I have the honor to be,

" E. SPENCER PRATT,  
" *United States Consul General.*

" [Inclosure.]

" AMERICA'S ALLIES—THE MANIFESTO OF THE FILIPINOS.

"The following is a translation from the Spanish of a proclamation of the rebel leaders in Hongkong, sent over to the Philippines in advance of the American squadron:—

"COMPATRIOTS: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach, and in a way that the most free and independent nation could hardly wish for

"The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune to extend their protecting mantle to our beloved country, now that they have been obliged to sever relations with Spain, owing to the tyranny this nation is exercising in Cuba, causing enormous injury to the Americans, who have such large commercial and other interests there."

[*Summary of Omissions:* Do not fire on the Americans who are your liberators, but rather on the Spaniards who are your natural enemies. The Americans will attack by sea, therefore we insurgents must attack by land. Assemble where you see the American flag flying. May the spirit of Rizal be with us and guide us to victory.]



“The archbishop has assured the people that four Spanish battle-ships are on their way out, and that God has informed him that in the next engagement the armies of the most Christian Spain will be victorious.”

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 350-352.]

*Consul Pratt to Mr. Day, Secretary of State.*

“No. 229.]

“CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

“*Singapore, June 9, 1898.*

“SIR,— I have the honor to report that this afternoon, on the occasion of the receipt of the news of General Aguinaldo’s recent successes near Manila, I was waited upon by the Philippine residents in Singapore and presented an address which, though written in Spanish, was delivered in French, and which I accordingly replied to in that language.

“The reports of the proceedings sent me by the editors of the Singapore Free Press and Straits Times, both of whom were present, I submit herewith, with duplicates for the press, should you consider their publication desirable.

“The original address in Spanish was not left with me, but I am promised it as soon as properly written out, and will then forward it.

“My reply, however, I cannot forward, as it was not written, but extemporaneous, and has been correctly rendered from the French into English in the within reports, from which you will note that I avoided touching upon the question of our future policy re the Philippines.

I have the honor, etc.,

“E. SPENCER PRATT,

“*United States Consul-General.*”

“[Inclosures. — The Straits Times, June 9.]

“MR. SPENCER PRATT SERENADED — MEETING OF FILIPINO REFUGEES AT THE UNITED STATES CONSULATE — THEY PRESENT AN ADDRESS TO MR. SPENCER PRATT AND DRINK TO AMERICA, ENGLAND, AND ADMIRAL DEWEY.

[The address, by Dr. Santos, is here omitted.]

“After listening to the address, the United States Consul-General, also speaking in French, said:—

“GENTLEMEN: The honor you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I cannot find appropriate words with which to thank you and with which to reply to the eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, though, that I fully understand and appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully

repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people from whom, I am sure, that they will meet with full and generous response.

“A little over a month ago the world resounded with the praises of Admiral Dewey and his fellow-officers and men for a glorious victory won by the American Asiatic Squadron in the Bay of Manila. Now we have news of the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, co-operating on land with the Americans at sea. You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command.

“When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito at Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour’s interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion; and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.

“I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, which has ended so happily. I can only hope that the eventful outcome will be all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos.

“My parting words to General Aguinaldo were, ‘General, when you have proved yourself great, prove yourself magnanimous’; and from the treatment accorded to the recent Spanish prisoners, it would appear that he has done so.”\*

\* The Singapore *Free Press* article, being almost word for word the same as the above, is here omitted.

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 356.]

[NOTE. — The following letter is inserted out of its chronological order, because it is a reply to the foregoing.]

*Secretary Day to Mr. Pratt, U. S. Consul-General.*

“No. 87.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

*Washington, July 20, 1898.*

“SIR, — Your No. 229 of the 9th ultimo, inclosing printed copies of a report from the Straits Times of the same day, entitled ‘Mr. Spencer Pratt’s Serenade,’ with a view to its communication to the press, has been received and considered.

“By Department’s telegram of the 17th of June you were instructed to avoid unauthorized negotiations with the Philippine insurgents. The reasons for this instruction were conveyed to you in my No. 78 of the 16th of June, by which the President’s views on the subject of your relations with General Aguinaldo were fully expressed.



“The extract now communicated from you from the Straits Times of the 9th of June has occasioned a feeling of disquietude and a doubt as to whether some of your acts may not have borne a significance and produced an impression which this government would be compelled to regret.

“The address presented to you by the twenty-five or thirty Filipinos who gathered about the consulate discloses an understanding on their part that the object of Admiral Dewey was to support the cause of General Aguinaldo, and that the ultimate object of our action is to secure the independence of the Philippines ‘under the protection of the United States.’

“Your address does not repel this implication, and it moreover represents that Aguinaldo was ‘sought out by you,’ whereas it had been the understanding of the Department that you received him only upon the request of a British subject named Bray, who formerly lived in the Philippines. Your further reference to General Aguinaldo as ‘the man for the occasion’ and to your ‘bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey which has resulted so happily,’ also represents the matter in a light which causes apprehension lest your action may have laid ground for future misunderstandings and complications.

“For these reasons the Department has not caused the article to be given to the press, lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction to views the expression of which it had not authorized.

“Respectfully yours,

“WILLIAM R. DAY.”

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 354-356.]

*Secretary Day to Mr. Pratt, U. S. Consul at Singapore.*

“No. 78.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

“Washington, June 16, 1898.

“SIR, —I have to acknowledge receipt of your confidential dispatch No. 112, of the 28th, April last, in which you report your proceedings in bringing together the insurgent general Emilio Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, before the latter’s departure for Manila. It appears that your meeting with General Aguinaldo was brought about through the good office of Mr. H. W. Bray, a British subject, who had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things in the Philippines, to abandon his property and business there, and that, after an interview with General Aguinaldo, you telegraphed to Admiral Dewey that the insurgent leader would come to Hongkong to arrange for a general co-operation of the insurgents, if this should be desired. The Admiral telegraphed in reply, ‘Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible.

As a consequence, General Aguinaldo, with his aid-de-camp and private secretary, left Singapore for Hongkong on the 26th of April, for the purpose of joining Admiral Dewey. You promise the Department a fuller account of your interview with General Aguinaldo by the next mail, and say that in arranging for his direct 'co-operation' with the commander of the United States forces you have prevented a possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

"The Department observes that you informed General Aguinaldo that you had no authority to speak for the United States; and in the absence of the fuller report which you promise, it is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify. This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes. While their contest with that power has been a matter of public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from this Government any recognition. The United States in entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military operations in that quarter will do so in the exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience which will be lawfully due from them.

"If, in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this Government would co-operate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his co-operation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he may put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.

"Respectfully yours,

"WILLIAM R. DAY."

*Consul Pratt to Mr. J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary of State.*

"No. 235.]

"CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

"Singapore, June 20, 1898.

"SIR, — I have the honor to report that I have received the Department's cipher telegram reading thus : —

"WASHINGTON, June 17.

"PRATT, Consul General, Singapore.

"Two hundred and twelve received and answered. Avoid unauthorized negotiations with Philippine insurgents.

"DAY.

and I have sent the Department the following cipher telegram in reply:—

“ SINGAPORE, June 19.

“ SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington* :

“ No intention negotiate. Left that Dewey who desired Aguinaldo come. PRATT.

which means that I neither have nor had any intention to negotiate with the Philippine insurgents, and, in the case of General Aguinaldo, was especially careful to leave such negotiations to Commodore Dewey.

“ My action in the matter was indeed limited to obtaining the assurance of General Aguinaldo’s willingness to co-operate with our forces, communicating this to Commodore Dewey, and, upon the latter’s expressing the desire that he should come on as soon as possible, arranging for the general to do so.

“ I shall anxiously await the instruction your telegram refers to for the Department’s opinion of my above course, but can scarcely believe, in view of the motives which prompted it, and the excellent results which have ensued, that it can be altogether disapproved.

“ I have, etc.,

“ E. SPENCER PRATT.”

*Consul Pratt to Mr. J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary of State.*

“ No. 236.]

“ CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

“ *Singapore, June 21, 1898.*

“ SIR,— In continuation of my dispatch No. 235, of the 20th instant, I beg to state that if, in regard to General Aguinaldo, I arranged directly with Commodore Dewey without obtaining the Department’s previous authorization, it was because of the little time there was in which to act and the practical impossibility of explaining by cable to the Department the value of the general’s co-operation, of which I felt the commodore would already be in a position to judge from what he must have learned of the situation while at Hongkong.

“ I beg further to state that it was not only on account of the material aid I was confident he would lend us that I regarded the co-operation of General Aguinaldo as so desirable, but also, because, as the recognized leader of the insurgents, he was, I considered, the one best able to direct and influence them, and therefore the one most important for our commander to have under immediate control, both as concerned the present and future policy of our government in the Philippines, whatever that policy might be.

“ Had it not been arranged for General Aguinaldo thus to co-operate with us it is more than probable that he would have returned to the

Islands of his own accord and undertaken independent operations which might, I fear, have caused us serious embarrassment. I am not having, nor do I propose to have, any further dealings here with the Philippine insurgents.

“ I have the honor, etc.,

“ E. SPENCER PRATT,

“ *U. S. Consul-General.*”

*Mr. Cridler to Mr. Pratt.*

“ No. 82.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

“ *Washington, June 25th, 1898.*

“ SIR, — I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches Nos. 214 (May 1) and 217 (May 5, 1898), in regard to arrangements made with Aguinaldo for co-operation with our Navy.

“ In reply I have to inform you that the Department is pleased to learn that you did not make any political pledges to Aguinaldo.

“ Respectfully yours,

“ THOS. W. CRIDLER,

“ *Third Assistant Secretary.*”

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 358.]

*Consul Pratt to Mr. Day, Secretary of State.*

“ No. 250.]

“ [Confidential.]

“ CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

“ *Singapore, July 28, 1898.*

“ SIR, — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your instruction No. 78, of the 16th ultimo, in reply to my dispatch No. 112, of the 28th of April last, reporting my proceedings in bringing together the insurgent leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, and Admiral Dewey before the latter's departure for Manila.

“ I have carefully considered your observations upon my action in this matter and beg to repeat what I have stated in my latter dispatches on the same subject, that I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines; that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the Government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would co-operate with him — General Aguinaldo — for the furtherance of any plan of his own, nor that, in accepting his said co-operation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward.

“ I have the honor, etc.,

“ E. SPENCER PRATT,

“ *United States Consul-General.*”

2. CORRESPONDENCE OF O. F. WILLIAMS, U. S. CONSUL  
AT MANILA.

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 329.]

*Consul Williams to Mr. Day, Secretary of State.*

“U. S. S. BALTIMORE:

“CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

“*Manila, Philippine Islands, June 16, 1898.*

“(Special.)

“SIR, — [*Summary of omissions: Insurgents active and successful against Spaniards. Aguinaldo directs operations from his headquarters. Filipinos, in contrast to Spaniards, emulate American treatment of wounded, prisoners, and non-combatants.*]

“For future advantage I am maintaining cordial relations with General Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forces when treating for their return here. Last Sunday, the 12th, they held a council to form provisional government. I was urged to attend, but thought best to decline. A form of government was adopted, but General Aguinaldo told me to-day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony of United States of America.

“It has been my effort to maintain harmony with insurgents in order to exercise greater influence hereafter when we re-organize government.

“Manila is hemmed in: foreigners other than Spaniards have, by kindness of Rear-Admiral Dewey, been allowed to leave the beleaguered city and are cared for on merchant ships in the bay.

[*Summary: Baltimore leaves to-morrow. Details of battle of May 1. Spanish fleet losses. Fear Manila may fall too soon.*]

“I have the honor, etc.,

“OSCAR F. WILLIAMS,

“*United States Consul.*”

[NOTE. — The following letter is printed out of its chronological order, as it is an answer to the preceding.]

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 330.]

*Mr. Cridler to Mr. Williams, U. S. Consul at Manila.*

“No. 18.]

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1898.

“SIR,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your special dispatch of the 16th of June last, copy of which has been sent to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Your course, while maintain-

ing amicable relations with the insurgents, in abstaining from any participation in the adoption of their so-called provisional government, is approved.

“Respectfully yours,

“THOS. W. CRIDLER,

“*Third Assistant Secretary.*”

[SENATE DOCUMENT 208, PAGE 15.]

*From letter of General Aguinaldo to Mr. Williams,  
United States Consul.*

“AUGUST 1, 1898.

[Omitted portions are not summarized, as this letter is printed in full in Pamphlet II., of this series, page 14.]

“I have done what they [the Filipinos] desire, establishing a government in order that nothing important may be done without consulting fully their sovereign will, not only because it was my duty, but also because acting in any other manner they would fail to recognize me as the interpreter of their aspirations and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me by another more careful of his honor and his dignity.

“I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the right of the North Americans to our gratitude, for we do not forget for a moment the favors we have received and are now receiving; but however great those favors may be, it is not possible for me to remove the distrust of my compatriots.

“These say that if the object of the United States is to annex these islands, why not recognize the government established in them, in order in that manner to join with it the same as by annexation?

“Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the Filipino generals and, uniting their forces, render the end more decisive?

“Is it intended, indeed, to carry out annexation against the wish of these people, distorting the legal sense of that word? If the revolutionary government is the genuine representative by right and deed of the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is it wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and friendship?

“It is useless for me to present to my compatriots the favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up to the present, the American forces have shown not an active, only a passive co-operation, from which they suppose that the intentions of these forces are not for the best. They assert, besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was brought from Hongkong to assure these forces by my presence that the Filipinos would not make common cause with

the Spaniards, and that they have delivered to the Filipinos the arms abandoned by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save themselves much labor, fatigue, blood, and treasure that a war with Spain would cost.

“ But I do not believe these unworthy suspicions. I have full confidence in the generosity and philanthropy which shine in characters of gold in the history of the privileged people of the United States, and for that reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me and the love which you have for my people, I pray you earnestly, as also the distinguished generals who represent your country in these islands, that you entreat the Government at Washington to recognize the revolutionary government of the Filipinos, and I, for my part, will labor with all my power with my people that the United States shall not repent their sentiments of humanity in coming to the aid of an oppressed people.”

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 331.]

*Consul Williams to Mr. Day, Secretary of State.*

“(Special.)

“CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

“MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

“U. S. S. *Baltimore, Manila Bay, August 4, 1898.*

“SIR, — It has been my study to keep on pleasant terms with General Aguinaldo for ultimate objects. By so doing I have avoided certain troubles and aided our forces. Admiral Dewey says I have planted the seeds of cordial co-operation.

“My argument with General Aguinaldo has been that the conditions of government by U. S. A. in the Philippine Islands would be vastly better for him and his people in honor, advancement, and profits than could exist under any plan fixed by himself and Filipinos. I have traversed the whole ground of government with him in council, and he has called his officials from fifteen provinces to meet me for their discussion, all stated as friendly but unofficial on my part. Our relations are cordial, while certain antagonisms have arisen between the General and certain other Americans.

“I hope to bring about harmony and co-operation for mutual good.

“I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant.

“OSCAR F. WILLIAMS,

“*United States Consul, Manila, Philippine Islands.*”

3. CORRESPONDENCE OF ROUNSEVELLE WILDMAN,  
U. S. CONSUL AT HONGKONG.

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 336.]

*Consul Wildman to Mr. Moore, Acting Secretary of State.*

“No. 63.]

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
“*Hongkong, July 18, 1898.*”

“SIR, — [*Summary of Omissions*: Spain cannot regain the Philippines. Superior character of the insurgent leaders; their object in fighting. “Systematic attempt to blacken” Aguinaldo’s character. Interviews with insurgent delegation.]

“On May 2, Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong and immediately called on me. It was May 16 before I could obtain permission from Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States ship *McCulloch*, and I put him aboard in the night so as to save any complications with the local government. Immediately on the arrival of Aguinaldo at Cavite, he issued a proclamation, which I had outlined for him before he left, forbidding pillage, and making it a criminal offence to maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step, if he hoped to maintain control over the natives, and from that date until the present time he has been uninterruptedly successful in the field and dignified and just as the head of his government. According to his own statements to me by letter, he has been approached by both the Spaniards and the Germans, and has had tempting offers made him by the Catholic Church. He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Consul Williams, and his own junta here in Hongkong, and nothing of moment has occurred which would lead any one to believe that he was not carrying out to the letter the promises made to me in this consulate.

“The insurgents are fighting for freedom from Spanish rule, and rely upon the well-known sense of justice that controls all the actions of our Government as to their future.

“In conclusion, I wish to put myself on record as stating that the insurgent government of the Philippine Islands cannot be dealt with as though they were North American Indians, willing to be removed from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the United States decides not to retain the Philippine Islands, its ten million people will demand independence, and the attempt of any foreign nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the same spirit with which they fought the Spaniards.

“I have the honor, etc.,

“ROUNSEVELLE WILDMAN, *Consul-General.*”



[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 338 TO 340.]

*Consul Wildman to Mr. Moore, Acting Secretary of State.*

“ No. 66.]

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

“ *Hongkong, August 9, 1898.*

“ SIR,—On August 7th, I received the following cablegram :—

“ WASHINGTON, *August 7, 1898.*

“ WILDMAN, *Consul Hongkong* : If you wrote Aguinaldo as reported by Hongkong correspondent of Daily Mail your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make pledges or discuss policy.

“ MOORE.

“ To which I replied on August 8, 1898:—

“ MOORE, *Washington* : Never made pledges or discussed policy of America with Aguinaldo further than to try and hold him to promises made before Dewey took him (to) Cavite, believing it my duty, it being understood that my influence is good. If report contrary, I disavow.

“ WILDMAN.

“ I feel it only justice to myself to make some explanation regarding the numerous newspaper reports that go from this city, and to the many opinions that are put into my mouth regarding the conduct of the war by my friends of the press. I have never so far taken occasion to deny any of them, knowing that the Department would realize that, through the incidents of war and the geographical situation of Hongkong, I have been placed in a position, through no desire of my own, which has made me a mark for the representatives of all the big newspapers of the world.

“ In my dispatch, No. 63, of July 18, 1898, I tried to briefly outline the position Consul Williams and myself had taken towards the insurgents. We believed that they were a necessary evil, and that if Aguinaldo was placed in command, and was acceptable to the insurgents as their leader, that Admiral Dewey or General Merritt would have some one whom they could hold responsible for any excesses. The other alternative was to allow the entire islands to be overrun by small bands bent only on revenge and looting. We considered that Aguinaldo had more qualifications for leadership than any of his rivals. We made him no pledges and extracted from him but two, viz., to obey unquestioningly the commander of the United States forces in the Philippine Islands, and to conduct his warfare on civilized lines. He was in and out of the consulate for nearly a month, and I believe I have taken his measure and that I acquired some influence with him. I have striven to retain his influence and have used it in conjunction with and with the full knowledge of both Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams.

“ Aguinaldo has written me by every opportunity, and I believe

that he has been frank with me regarding both his actions and his motives. I do not doubt that he would like to be President of the Philippine Republic, and there may be a small coterie of his native advisers who entertain a like ambition, but I am perfectly certain that that majority of his followers, and all the wealthy Filipinos have but one desire — to become citizens of the United States of America. As for the mass of uneducated natives they would be content under any rule save that of friars. My correspondence with Aguinaldo has been strictly of a personal nature, and I have missed no opportunity to remind him of his antebellum promises. His letters are childish, and he is far more interested in the kind of a cane he will carry or the breastplate he will wear than the figure he will make in history. The demands that he and his junta here have made upon my time is excessive and tiresome. He is a man of petty moods, and I have repeatedly had letters from Consul Williams requesting me to write to Aguinaldo a friendly letter congratulating him on his success, and reminding him of his obligations. I do not care to quote Admiral Dewey, as his letters are all of a strictly personal nature, but I feel perfectly free to refer you to him as to my attitude and actions. I do not say this because I feel that I need to make any defence, but because I believe that the Daily Mail to which you refer in the above telegram has misconstrued my attitude, and placed me in a false position.

“I find on investigation that the letter you refer to as published in the London Mail was a personal one, written by me on July 25th, at the request of Consul Williams, and on lines with which we have been working with Aguinaldo from the first. Aguinaldo had for some weeks been getting what Admiral Dewey called a ‘big head,’ and writing me sulky, childish letters. In consequence I wrote him in part as follows:

“‘If you stand shoulder to shoulder with our forces, and do not allow any small differences of opinion and fancied slights to keep you from the one set purpose of freeing your island from the cruelties under which you claim it has been groaning for so many hundred years, your name in history will be a glorious one. There are greater prizes in the world than that of being the mere chief of a revolution. Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were suffering, and not for the love of conquest or the hope of gain. Whatever the final disposition of the conquered territory may be you can trust to the United States that justice and honor will control all their dealings with you. The first thing is to throw off the Spanish yoke. Do not let anything interfere with this.’

“If the newspapers can make anything out of this personal letter

that looks like a pledge or an assumption on my part of powers that are not vested in me, I must decline to accept their interpretation, and in so much as Aguinaldo himself does not so construe it, I trust the Department will not consider that I have exceeded the bounds of discretion or embarrassed the Department in any way.

“ I have the honor, etc.,

“ ROUNSEVELLE WILDMAN,

“ *Consul-General.*”

## II. REPORTS OF COMMANDING OFFICERS.

### 1. Rear-Admiral Dewey's Relations with Aguinaldo.

#### A. CONTEMPORARY REPORTS TO WASHINGTON.

[REPORT OF ADMIRAL DEWEY FOR 1898, PAGE 40.]

“ HONGKONG, *May 24, 1898* (Cavite, May 20).

“ SECRETARY OF NAVY, *Washington:*

“ Situation unchanged. Strict blockade is continued. Great scarcity prevails at Manila. Foreign subjects fear an outbreak of the Spanish soldiers. Arrangements have been made for them to be transferred to Cavite by the foreign men-of-war, if necessary. Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief, was brought down by the *McCulloch*. Organizing forces near Cavite and may render assistance that will be valuable. I do not consider submarine mines here practicable, on account of great depth and width of bay and entrance. If attacked by superior force, the squadron will endeavor to give a good account of itself. The American bark *Saranac* was captured off Iloilo, Philippine Islands. Upon the arrival of the *Charleston* with ammunition, I propose to recapture and clear the island of small Spanish gun vessels. When is *Charleston* expected to arrive? I request you will send to the Asiatic Station the *Bennington* and the *Yorktown*, if possible. Will be more useful than the *Philadelphia*. How many troops coming here *Pekin*? When expected to arrive? I request send provisions for squadron — 2,000 men for three months. Also small stores.

DEWEY.”

[PAGE 41.]

“ WASHINGTON, *May 26, 1898.*

“ DEWEY (care American Consul), *Hongkong:*

“ You must exercise discretion most fully in all matters, and be governed according to circumstance which you know and we cannot know. You have our confidence entirely. It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent with your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents, or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future.

LONG.”

HONGKONG, *May 27, 1898* (Cavite, *May 29*).

“SECRETARY OF NAVY,

“*Washington:*

“No change in the situation of the blockade. Is effective. It is impossible for the people in Manila to buy provisions except rice. The French men-of-war must go to Saigon for provisions. It is important that I should know as early as possible whereabouts and strength of possible Spanish expedition to the Philippines, and if possible that the squadron should be reinforced with a battleship or armored cruiser. The captain of the *Olympia* (Gridley) condemned by medical survey; is ordered home; leave by Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company's steamer from Hongkong on May 28. Commander Lamberton has been appointed to the command of the *Olympia*. Steamer has just arrived from Amoy with three thousand Mauser rifles and great amount of ammunition for Aguinaldo, whose force is increasing constantly. \* \* \* [*Stars as in Report.*] Bark *Saranac* is sailing under the British flag; is loading with sugar at Iloilo for New York. “DEWEY.”

[PAGE 24.]

“HONGKONG, *May 30, 1898.*

“SECRETARY OF NAVY, *Washington:*

“Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited the *Olympia* yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt ability to succeed; situation remains unchanged. DEWEY.”

“HONGKONG, *June 6, 1898* (Cavite, *June 3*).

“SECRETARY OF NAVY,

“*Washington:*

“Receipt of telegram of May 26 is acknowledged, and I thank the Department for the expression of confidence. Have acted according to the spirit of the Department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the defences of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession. DEWEY.”

[PAGE 43.]

WASHINGTON, *June 14, 1898.*

“DEWEY (Care American Consul), *Hongkong.*

“Report fully any conferences, relations, or co-operations, military or otherwise, which you have had with Aguinaldo, and keep informed the Department in that respect. “LONG.”

“ HONGKONG, June 27, 1898.

“ SECRETARY OF NAVY, *Washington*:

“ Receipt of telegram, June 14, is acknowledged. Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by permission on *Nanshan*. Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water, recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The United States has not been bound in any way to assist the insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they not yet having many guns. In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence and capable of self government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.

DEWEY.”

[PAGE 44 ]

“ [PROCLAMATIONS ISSUED BY GENERAL AGUINALDO.]

“ No. 307 D.] U. S. NAVAL FORCE ON ASIATIC STATION,  
 “ *Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, June 12, 1898.*

“ SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Department, copies, with translations, of three proclamations issued by General Aguinaldo, the insurgent leader in the Philippines.

“ Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“ GEORGE DEWEY,

“ *Rear-Admiral U. S. N.,*

“ *Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.*

“ THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

“ *Washington, D. C.*

“ (Bureau of Navigation.)”

[*Summary of Proclamations*: (1) The United States manifests a disinterested protection for us, considering us capable of governing for ourselves. Respect hospitals, ambulances, lives and property of all foreigners, enemies who lay down their arms, etc., under penalty.—CAVITE, May 24, 1898.

(2) Five months having elapsed since the treaty with the Spaniards without their taking any step towards the promised reforms, and the United States having come to offer disinterested protection, I return to establish a dictatorial government until these Islands are able to form a constitutional one.—CAVITE, May 24, 1898.

(3) This dictatorial government proposes to begin military operations. No treaty negotiations to be tolerated with Spain. Spies to be executed. Filipinos who enter Spanish service to be hung as traitors.—CAVITE, May 24, 1898.]

[PAGE 50.]

“HONGKONG, July 7, 1898 (Cavite, July 4).

“SECRETARY OF NAVY, *Washington*:

“The receipt of telegram is acknowledged. The United States troops have landed, and have been comfortably housed at Cavite, Luzon Island. Insurgents are still active. The Chinese subjects have been permitted to leave freely. Cold storage steamer has not yet arrived. Aguinaldo proclaimed himself president of the Revolutionary Republic on July 1.  
DEWEY.”

“HONGKONG, July 13, 1898.

“SECRETARY OF NAVY, *Washington*:

“Aguinaldo informed me that his troops had taken all of Subic Bay except Isla Grande, which they were prevented from taking by the German man-of-war *Irene*. On July 7 sent the *Raleigh* and the *Concord* there; they took the island and about one thousand three hundred men with arms and ammunition; no resistance. The *Irene* retired from the bay on their arrival. I shall send the *Boston Cape Engano* about July 16, to meet second army detachment. It is not practicable to send Guam. No chartered vessel available.

“DEWEY.”

[PAGE 51.]

“BACCOOR, July 15, 1898.

“*His Excellency the Admiral of Squadron of the United States in the Islands*:

“SIR,—The revolution having taken possession of the various provinces of the archipelago, this government has found it necessary to adopt the form and organization best suited to the popular will. I have, therefore, the pleasure and the honor of placing in your hand the inclosed decrees [*See Report of Secretary of the Navy for 1898*,

pages 111 to 117], which contain the organization referred to, begging that you will communicate to your Government that the desires of this government are to remain always in friendship with the great North American nation to which we are under many obligations.

"I beg also that your Excellency will have the kindness to forward the inclosed package to H. B. M. consul, with a request from me that he will forward them to their respective destinations.

"For which favor the Filipino people and your humble servant will be most deeply grateful to your Excellency.

"Very respectfully, etc.,

"EMILIO AGUINALDO."

"Indorsement to the above.

"[FIRST INDORSEMENT.]

"U. S. FLAGSHIP OLYMPIA,

"Cavite, July 17, 1898.

"Respectfully forwarded for the information of the Department.

"GEORGE DEWEY,

"Rear-Admiral, U. S. N.,

"Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station."

[EDITOR'S NOTE. — There is apparently no second indorsement.]

[PAGE 57.]

"HONGKONG, July 22, 1898.

"SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington:

"The following is for the Secretary of War: —

"Aguinaldo declares dictator (ship) and martial law over all the islands. The people expect independence. Recommend China ponies.

"ANDERSON, Commanding.

"DEWEY."

[PAGE 58.]

"HONGKONG, July 30, 1898 (Cavite, July 26).

"SECRETARY OF NAVY, Washington:

"Merritt arrived yesterday in the *Newport*. The remainder of the expedition is expected within the next few days. Situation is most critical in Manila. The Spanish may surrender at any moment. Merritt's most difficult problem will be how to deal with insurgents under Aguinaldo, who has become aggressive and even threatening toward our army. The *Monadnock* was at Honolulu on July 8; expected to leave four days later \* \* \* [*Stars in original.*]

"DEWEY."

## B. LATER ACCOUNTS OF THE ABOVE TRANSACTIONS.

[REPORT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION, VOL. I., PAGE 171.]

*Admiral Dewey's Summary for the Philippine Commission.*

“ Finally, on May 19, Aguinaldo came.

“ The following memorandum on this subject has been furnished the commission by Admiral Dewey :—

## “ MEMORANDUM OF RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO.

“ On April 24, 1898, the following cipher dispatch was received at Hongkong from Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul-General at Singapore :—

“ Aguinaldo, insurgent leader here. Will come Hongkong; arrange with Commodore for general co-operation insurgents, Manila, if desired. Telegraph. PRATT.”

“ On the same day Commodore Dewey telegraphed Mr. Pratt, ‘ Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible,’ the necessity for haste being due to the fact that the squadron had been notified by the Hongkong government to leave those waters by the following day. The squadron left Hongkong on the morning of the 25th and Mirs Bay on the 27th. Aguinaldo did not leave Singapore until the 26th, and so did not arrive in Hongkong in time to have a conference with the admiral.

“ It had been reported to the commodore as early as March 1, by the United States consul at Manila, and others, that the Filipinos had broken out into insurrection against the Spanish authority in the vicinity of Manila, and on March 30, Mr. Williams had telegraphed ‘ Five thousand rebels armed in camp near city. Loyal to us in case of war.’

“ Upon the arrival of the squadron at Manila it was found that there was no insurrection to speak of, and it was accordingly decided to allow Aguinaldo to come to Cavite on board the *McCulloch*. He arrived with thirteen of his staff on May 19, and immediately came on board the *Olympia* to call on the Commander-in-chief, after which he was allowed to land at Cavite and organize an army. This was done with the purpose of strengthening the United States forces and weakening those of the enemy. No alliance of any kind was entered into with Aguinaldo, nor was any promise of independence made to him then or at any other time.”

[CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 56TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION,  
PAGE 1329.]

*Letter received by Senator Lodge, January 31, 1900, read by him that day to the Senate.*

“ DEAR SENATOR LODGE, — The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo recently published in the Springfield Republican as far as it relates



to me is a tissue of falsehood. I never promised him, directly or indirectly, independence for the Filipinos. I never treated him as an ally, except so far as to make use of him and his natives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards. He never uttered the word 'independence' in any conversation with me or my officers. The statement that I received him with military honors and saluted the Filipino flag is absolutely false.

"Sincerely yours,

"GEORGE DEWEY."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 387, PAGE 4.]

"OFFICE OF THE ADMIRAL,

"1747 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE,

Washington, May 17, 1900.

"SIR, — Replying to the Department's letter of the 14th instant, I have the honor to inform you that the flag of the so-called Philippine Republic was never saluted by me or by any of the vessels of the squadron under my command.

"Isla Grande, Subig Bay, was captured by the *Raleigh* and *Concord*, under my orders, as reported in my telegram of July 10, 1898. There was no assistance to or co-operation with Aguinaldo's forces.

"The vessels named captured the Spanish garrison of said island without assistance from any one, as indicated in the above-mentioned dispatch.

"The said garrison was turned over to the Filipinos for safe-keeping, as shown in the report made by Capt. J. B. Coghlan, U. S. N., on file in the Department. The prisoners had refused to give parole, and there were no facilities at my command for their care. Aguinaldo had promised that they should be treated humanely and according to the laws of war.

"I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

"GEORGE DEWEY,

Admiral U. S. N.

"THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 499-501.]

From "Statement of Gen. Charles A. Whittier, U. S. V., before the United States Peace Commission at Paris."

"Aguinaldo went to Cavite, under the permission of Admiral Dewey, in reply to a telegram sent by Spencer Pratt, Esq., our consul-general at Singapore, who offered that chief money for his expenses. The offer was declined. After arrival (on one of our ships) he went ashore, accompanied by thirteen staff officers, to organize his army; but no adherents appeared the first day, and Aguinaldo, rather discouraged, meditated returning to Hongkong. I think Dewey

advised him to make another effort, at the same time saying that he must leave the public buildings at Cavite, where he had made his headquarters. Soon, from across the bay and from all sides, men gathered. The fact that Dewey permitted the armed men to move from the surrounding districts, and for the rebels to take arms (not many, says the Admiral) in the arsenal, was the only help we gave him, excepting, of course, the most important destruction of the Spanish navy. From that time the military operations and the conduct of the insurgents have been most creditable. Positions taken and movements of troops show great ability on the part of some leader—I do not say that it is necessarily Aguinaldo, but he gave the directions.

“The CHAIRMAN.

“Q. How many men did he get together?—A. His forces went around the city, taking the waterworks and the north part of the city, and running up the railroad. I asked that question of several, and the opinions differed widely—all the way from eight thousand to thirty or forty thousand men.

“Q. Do you think that he had as many as eight thousand men before the surrender?—A. Yes, sir; the environment of the city took a great many men. There is a vast extent of country there, including the waterworks and running around the city, and they certainly had to have more than that to do it.

“Q. How many arms did Dewey turn over to them?—A. I never knew exactly. I have asked him that question and he said a very few.

“Q. Where did they get the rest of their arms?—A. Some captured from the Spanish, some brought to him by deserters, and there were some shipments of arms from Hongkong—I believe Americans brought them in—and they have lately taken some to Batangas in the southern part, and have taken some new Maxim guns in there, too.

“Mr. GRAY.

“Q. To the insurgents?—A. Yes.

“Q. Since the capitulation?—A. Yes; they changed the name of a vessel and used it. She had had a Luzon name, the *Pasig*, and they changed it to the *Abby*. Dewey sent down and seized the boat, and the insurgents followed to Manila Bay, hoping to reclaim it. In other respects their demands, from their point of view, have not been unreasonable, and show a proper appreciation of the status.

“*Statement Resumed.*

“The day after the surrender (August 13) four representatives of Aguinaldo called on General Merritt, who assured them in general terms that ‘we are the friends of the Filipinos.’ At that time they

occupied a portion of Manila. We soon demanded that they should give that up, to which Aguinaldo's representative agreed, but in seeking confirmation from him the condition was made that in case we gave up the country they should be restored to the positions then occupied and which were taken greatly by their own merits. However, matters have been amicably settled. Aguinaldo's headquarters are at Malolos, twenty-three miles up the railroad. His troops control all the settled part of the island (except Manila), as well as much of the southern country.

"The CHAIRMAN.

"Q. What do you mean by the 'southern country' — those islands below? — A. Yes, sir.

"Their conduct to their Spanish prisoners has been deserving of the praise of all the world. With hatred of priests and Spaniards, fairly held on account of the conditions before narrated, and with every justification to a savage mind for the most brutal revenge, I have heard no instance of torture, murder, or brutality since we have been in the country.

"The CHAIRMAN.

"Q. Did you ever talk with Admiral Dewey about his relations with Aguinaldo? — A. Yes, sir. He read me a copy of his dispatch in answer to the one in which he asked the question whether he had made any promises, and he said he had not. Aguinaldo went down with his concurrence without doubt, and the admiral allowed armed people to cross the bay and join him and made no remonstrance.

"Q. Did he furnish him any arms? — A. He says not, except a few furnished them from Cavite. Foreman, in his article, makes the statement that he has a treaty with Aguinaldo, and I went one morning and left the article with the admiral to read, and he said it was not true.

"Q. This relation — whatever Admiral Dewey did — took place before he got the dispatch of inquiry from the Navy Department, sometime before? — A. Yes.

"Q. How far does the admiral say he encouraged Aguinaldo? — A. I do not think he says he gave him any encouragement, except that he rather dissuaded him from returning to Hongkong when he was discouraged.

"Q. Did you get that statement from Dewey? — A. Yes. Aguinaldo was rather discouraged when any of the people failed to come to his banner on the first day. That dispatch also included a statement that he knew well the Filipinos and the Cubans, and that the Filipinos were a far superior people — I think that was in that dispatch; it was in one.

“MR. FRYE.

“Q. Were they of material assistance to us?—A. Very great. If the protocol had not been signed I think the Spanish at home would have insisted upon their army doing something. They dismissed Augustin because he was not disposed to fight, and I think if they had not had this experience of having been driven back into the city and the water cut off so even that Jaudenes said he could not remove his non-combatants, the Government would have insisted on his making a fight, and he could have made a very good one, for his position was strong, if they had any fight in them at all. But every place had been taken from them by the Filipinos, who managed their advances and occupation of the country in an able manner.”

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 421, 422.]

*From “Memoranda concerning the situation in the Philippines on August 30, 1898, by F. V. Greene, Major-General, Volunteers, and accompanying papers.”*

“On the 24th day of April Aguinaldo met the United States consul and others at Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in conjunction with the operations of the United States Navy at Manila. This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey, and by his consent, or at his request, Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong on April 26; and when the *McCulloch* went to Hongkong early in May to carry the news of Admiral Dewey’s victory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila Bay. They soon after landed at Cavite, and the admiral allowed them to take such guns, ammunition, and stores as he did not require for himself. With these and some other arms which he had brought from Hongkong, Aguinaldo armed his followers, who rapidly assembled at Cavite, and in a few weeks he began moving against the Spaniards. Part of these surrendered, giving him more arms, and others retreated to Manila.

“Soon afterwards two ships, which were private property of Señor Agoncillo and other insurgent sympathizers, were converted into cruisers and sent with insurgent troops, to Subig Bay and other places to capture provinces outside of Manila. They were very successful, the native militia in Spanish service capitulating with their arms in nearly every case without serious resistance.”

[PAGES 423, 424.]

“The problem of how to deal with Aguinaldo’s government and troops will necessarily be accompanied with embarrassment and difficulty, and will require much tact and skill in its solution. The United States Government, through its naval commander, has to some extent

made use of them for a distinct military purpose, viz., to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our troops; and for this purpose the Admiral allowed them to take arms and ammunition which he had captured at Cavite and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Bay in their expeditions against other provinces. But the Admiral has been very careful to give Aguinaldo no assurance of recognition and no pledges or promises of any description. The services which Aguinaldo and his adherents rendered in preparing the way for attack on Manila are certainly entitled to consideration; but, after all, they were small in comparison with what was done by our own fleet and army."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 208, PAGE 26.]

*From "Note of Explanation," apparently added by Major Bell, to a letter from Aguinaldo to General Merritt, dated August 27, 1898, praying him "to reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships from free navigation."*

"I gather from the statements of many naval officers that Aguinaldo was invited here and given much assistance and encouragement by Admiral Dewey, who, of course, did not anticipate any complication, and probably never supposed Aguinaldo would at once assume an independence of American control. He has been much concerned and displeased by Aguinaldo's course of conduct, and told me several days ago that he had ceased to recognize him in any way, and had refused to any longer receive his representatives. This prayer to you to 'reclaim' Admiral Dewey's protection is doubtless due to this change of attitude on the admiral's part, who, if permitted to follow his own inclinations, will not only grant Aguinaldo no protection, but will seize his boats and launches at the first overt act."

[PAGE 27.]

"Of course they could never have made the progress they did in investing the city had it not been for the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey; but they did do much hard fighting and did drive the Spanish from positions in the provinces immediately surrounding Manila into the confines of the city itself. This credit they are entitled to."

## 2. Major-General Merritt's Relations with Aguinaldo.

[REPORT OF SECRETARY OF WAR FOR 1898, PAGE 49.]

*From "Report of Major-General Merritt."*

"I discovered during my visit to General Greene that the left or north flank of his brigade camp extended to a point on the 'Calle Real,' about three thousand two hundred yards from the outer line of the Spanish defences of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched way to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, through swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the town and encircling the city completely.

"The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the Spaniards for several months, and were, at the time of my arrival, in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from ten thousand men. These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of investment, opposite to the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent; and on the particular road called the 'Calle Real,' passing along the front of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila, the insurgents had established an earth-work or trench within eight hundred yards of the powder magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to the right, leading from the village to Pasay, and this approach by the beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our relations with the insurgents, which may be briefly stated as follows:

"Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay the principal leader of the insurgents, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavite from Hongkong, and, with consent of our naval authorities, began active work in raising troops and pushing the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having met with some success and the natives flocking to his assistance, he proclaimed an independent government of republican form, with himself as president, and, at the time of our arrival in the islands, the entire edifice of executive and legislative departments and subdivisions of territory for administrative purposes had been accomplished, at least on paper, and the Filipinos held

military possession of many points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila.

“As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President [*Special instructions from the President, furnished me by the Honorable Secretary of War under date of May 23, 1898.* See Report, page 48] fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not, until then, be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

“For these reasons the preparations for the attack of the city were pressed and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasig Road, on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and the suburbs.

“To return to the situation of General Greene’s brigade, as I found it on my arrival, it will be seen that the difficulty in obtaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to withdraw from the beach and the ‘Calle Real,’ so that Greene could move forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control of the roads in their immediate front. No objection was made and accordingly General Greene’s brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on the ‘Calle Real’ and the beach, and constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the Utah batteries was placed.”

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 401.]

“OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR,

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,

“Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

“Manila, Aug. 24, 1898.

“Bakor, Philippine Islands.

“SIR, — [*Summary of omitted paragraphs: Navigation of the Patria. Protection you ask for from American squadron rests with Rear-Admiral Dewey. You cannot occupy the suburbs of Manila.*]

"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain is concerned, it is utterly impossible for me, as a military representative only of the United States, to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon the good will of Americans out here and the Government of which you already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in the future.

"This answer to your communication has been delayed by a press of business which could not very well be neglected.

"I thank you, in the name of my country, for the good will expressed toward it, and feel assured that nothing will occur to mar the friendly feeling that now exists. It is for the interests of all that the good feeling which now exists between us should be carefully fostered and maintained. "Very respectfully,

"WESLEY MERRITT."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 366, 367.]

*From "Statement of Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., October 4, 1898, before the United States Peace Commission at Paris."*

"GENERAL MERRITT. I do not know that the Commission will be interested in that. It is correspondence between General Anderson and Aguinaldo, and relates largely to Aguinaldo's growing views. The whole correspondence was deprecated by Admiral Dewey before I got there, and I suppressed the whole thing after I arrived, because it was not the wish of the Government to make any promises to the insurgents or act in any way with them.

"The correspondence was read by the Secretary. [See pages 44 to 55 of this pamphlet.]

"MR. FRYE. In obtaining supplies, in what money did you pay?

"GENERAL MERRITT. The money of the country.

"MR. FRYE. Mexican silver?

"GENERAL MERRITT. Yes, sir. With reference to the last letter read, that letter and one other letter received from Aguinaldo, which has been mislaid and which I cannot reproduce, I made no reply to, except to tell him that he must withdraw his forces outside those limits.

"The commission he refers to was brought me by General Anderson. He asked me if I would talk to them, and I said I would. It was a few days after the surrender, and I received them at my headquarters in Manila, and they agreed the insurgents should withdraw outside any lines I might designate. I detailed two officers, General Greene and General MacArthur, to designate a line in red pencil, and gave it to them on a map, and told them I should insist upon the withdrawal of his troops. It took in part of the lines Aguinaldo's troops had



occupied previous to our getting there, but it was necessary to enforce a proper status between the insurgents and our own forces and to keep them out of Manila.

“ Before that time, rather early after my arrival there at Manila, I had telegraphed to the War Department of the possible trouble that might arise with the insurgents, and asked for instructions as to whether I should consider them as enemies and treat them accordingly in such case. To that request I had no reply, and the consequence was I had to mix diplomacy with force in order to avoid a tilt with them. I knew, if bloodshed was once had, that would be the end of an amicable status there, and to that end I was careful to enforce that which was proper and which I conceived must be executed in order to have my troops fully occupy the ground we had taken. In his letters to General Anderson, he speaks of concessions they made there in the occupation of lines. They did. I told General Greene — gave him the instructions — to try to get these positions by an amicable arrangement if possible, but, if necessary, to report the facts to me, and I should use force to secure them. At the time I went there I found we had no lines, no base upon which to approach Manila. The insurgents had their pickets in front of ours, and our main guard was in the rear of their main guard, and I gave General Greene orders to change that status, which he did, and purely by arrangement with the general of whom Major Bell speaks as being a very sensible fellow and a good fellow. It appears when the request was made of him, he corresponded with Aguinaldo and the latter agreed to it.”

### 3. Brigadier-General Anderson's Relations with Aguinaldo.

[Submitted in part to the Peace Commission at Paris by General Merritt. See Senate Document 62, Part I., page 390 *et seq.* Given more fully in Senate Document 208, Part I., from which the following quotations are made. As the complete correspondence is of great interest, letters omitted here for lack of space are summarized. We keep to the arrangement of the document, which sacrifices chronological order for the sake of having letters followed directly by their replies.]

[SENATE DOCUMENT 208, PAGES 4, 5.]

“ HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,

“ UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

“ *Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 4th, 1898.*

“ SENOR DON EMILIO AGUINALDO,

“ *Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon:*

“ GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this

vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands.

“For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people co-operate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces.

“In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this, I do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule.

“I would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain order, and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and kindness.

“I have, therefore, the honor to ask your Excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that they cannot visit Cavite without permission.

“Assuring you again of my most friendly sentiments and distinguished consideration, I am, with all respect,

“THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

“*Brigadier-General U. S. V., Commanding.*”

“True copy.

“J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*”

“L. R. No. 34. Received July 5, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio. No date or place.

“*Brief.*—Expresses an interpretation of sentiments of the natives of the Philippine Islands toward the great North American nation and announces his agreeable relations with the United States military authorities, etc.

“*Action.*—Forwarded to General Merritt, July 27, as an inclosure to L. S. 45.

“Brig.-Gen. THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

“*Commanding the United States Volunteers :*

“GENERAL,—Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine people, I have the honor to express to your Excellency my most profound gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire the great North American nation and your Excellency.

“I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly relations with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special satisfaction whenever occasion represents.

“ I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their being unfulfilled ; hoping that you will inform me of whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my command, so as to reprimand them and correspond with your wishes.

“ I beg of your Excellency to accept in return the assurance of my most respectable consideration.

“ I remain, respectfully,

“ EMILIO AGUINALDO.”

“ HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,

“ U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

“ Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 6, 1898.

“ Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY,

“ *Commanding Philippine Forces :*

“ GENERAL, — I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both.

“ Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For this I would like to have your Excellency's advice and co-operation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country.

“ It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy. But for a short time we must organize and land supplies, and also retain a place for storing them near our fleet and transports.

“ I am solicitous to avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the same place.

“ I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precaution. Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections with mine, and fear epidemic diseases if the vicinity is not made clean.

“ Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons? I again renew my assurances of distinguished consideration.

“ I am with great respect,

“ THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

*Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*

“ True copy.

“ J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*”

[PAGE 6.]

*Anderson to Aguinaldo, July 14, 1898.*

[*Summary*: Request that my officers on reconnoissance have your assistance and advice.]

“L. R. No. 122. Received July 20, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, General Philippine forces. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., July 15, 1898.

“*Brief*. — States that his government has seen necessity of adopting form and organization more adequately popular. Expresses friendly and harmonious relations with ‘the great North American nation.’

“*Action*. — Forwarded to General Merritt, July 27, as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.”

[PAGE 7.]

*Anderson, per Chief Quartermaster S. R. Jones, to Aguinaldo, July 17, 1898.*

[*Summary*: Supplies and transport needed from Filipinos, who are tardy in giving this assistance. Ready to pay fair prices for supplies and labor. Would regret to seize anything by force, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos.]

“L. R. No. 137. Received July 22, 1898. From Jones, Sam R., Chief Quartermaster, First Brigade. Dated at Cavite, P. I., July 20, 1898.

“*Brief*. — States that it is impossible to procure transportation except upon Señor Aguinaldo’s order, in this section, who has an inventory of everything. The natives have removed their wheels and hid them.

“*Action*. — Filed.”

[PAGES 8-13.]

*Anderson to Aguinaldo, July 19, 1898.*

[*Summary*: The bearer, Major Bell, was sent by General Merritt to get information. Please let him see your maps, furnish him with information, passes, etc.]

“L. R. No. 47 (new series). Received August 8, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., near Manila, July 18, 1898.

“*Brief*. — Relative to the assistance of his people to us in furnishing supplies and transportation. Retains his great admiration for the great North American nation. No action recorded.

*Anderson to Aguinaldo, July 19, 1898.*

*Summary*: Thanks for offer of assistance and assurances of good will. Assure your people that there will be no confiscation of their property without compensation.]

"L. R. No. 166. Received July 25, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, General Philippine forces. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., July 24, 1898.

"*Brief.* — Makes a statement as to the course of Osorio in Cavite, and also makes full statement of his connection with the revolution and the United States forces.

"*Action.* — Forwarded to General Merritt, July 27, as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.

"HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,  
"U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,  
"Cavite Arsenal, July 22, 1898.

"Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,  
"Commanding Philippine Forces:

"GENERAL, — Replying to your Excellency's letter in relation to the property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to state that if he transferred the property to you personally, before the capture of Cavite by our forces, it will give me great pleasure to transfer the property to you, in question. If, however, the property was not transferred to your Excellency until after the capture of Cavite, the property would appear to have been public Spanish property or contraband of war, and subject to capture.

"This property will be held subject to investigation, but Don Osorio must make his claim and offer his proof to the commanding officer of the American army.

"I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself as a dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I have no orders from my Government on the subject; and as far as I can ascertain, your independent status has not been recognized by any foreign power. Your fine intellect must perceive that, happy as I am to see you fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy, I cannot, without orders, recognize your civil authority.

"I remain, with great respect,

"THOMAS M. ANDERSON,  
"Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

"True copy.

"J. F. BELL, Major of Engineers, U. S. V."

"[Translation.]

"BACOR, July 24, 1898.

"Señor Don THOMAS M. ANDERSON,  
"Brigadier-General, Commanding  
"Expeditionary Forces of the United States.

"GENERAL: In answer to the letter of your Excellency, dated the 22d of the current month, I have the honor to manifest to you the following:

“ That even supposing that the effects existing in the storehouse of Don Antonio Osorio were subject to capture, when I established myself in the plaza (town) of Cavite, Admiral Dewey authorized me to dispose of everything I might find in the same, including the arms which the Spaniards left in the arsenal. But I was aware that the said effects belonged to the personal property of a Filipino, who traded in them by virtue of the payment of a contribution to the Spanish Government. I would not have touched them if the owner had not placed them at my disposition for the purposes of war.

“ I came from Hongkong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] \* to any internal discord, because [being] a judge of their desires, I had the strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects, establishing a government according to their desires.

“ Thus it is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards, when some of the provinces had already liberated themselves from the Spanish domination, I established a revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a democratic and popular character as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order that they [the provinces] might be justly represented and administered to their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the right of preference to our gratitude.

“ Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors we have received through Admiral Dewey, and [being] more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation but also to that of your Excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights.

“ I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to your Excellency the necessity, that, before disembarking, you should communicate in

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\* The brackets in this letter are as given in the Senate Document.

writing to the government the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent the commission of any transgression against friendship.

“I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I cannot answer for that which another nation whose friendship is not well guaranteed might inspire in it [the people], and it is certain that I do this not as menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always professed for the North American people, in the complete security that it will find itself completely identified with our cause of liberty.

“With the greatest respect and consideration,

“EMILIO AGUINALDO.

*Anderson [unsigned] to Aguinaldo, July 23, 1898.*

[*Summary*: As you represent your people, I have the honor to requisition transport from you. If you cannot secure it, I shall have to requisition directly on the people.]

“L. R. No. 167. Received July 25, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, General Philippine forces. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., July 24, 1898.

“*Brief*. — States that he misunderstood the desires of the United States forces before, but now he will assist in supplying all requisitions for transportation if given reasonable notice and time.

“*Action*. — Forwarded to General Merritt July 27 as an inclosure to R. S. No. 45.”

“[Translation.]

“BACoor, July 24, 1898.

“Señor Don THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

“*Brigadier-General, Commander of the*

“*Expeditionary Forces of the United States.*

“GENERAL: Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to manifest to your Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt of my response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked of me in the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I replied in a precise manner, through the bearer, that I was disposed to give convenient orders whenever you advised me of the number of these with due anticipation (notice).

“I have circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I cannot assure your Excellency that we have the number of five hundred that is needed, because horses are not abundant in these vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in January and March last.

“Whenever we have them united (or collected) I shall have the pleasure to advise your Excellency.

“I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal fifty carts that I shall place at your disposition whenever necessary, always (premissing) that you afford me a previous advice of four days in anticipation.

“Remaining, with great respect,

“EMILIO AGUINALDO.

*Anderson to Aguinaldo, July 24, 1898.*

[*Summary*: Pleased to think there was a misapprehension by the people as to requisitions. Depot will be established to receive and pay for supplies and transact business with your people.]

[NOTE. — The following letter, while not to Aguinaldo, is inserted just as it occurs in Senate Document 208. It may be found useful as a summary in the midst of the Aguinaldo correspondence.]

“[Extract.]

“HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,

“U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

“*Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898.*

“ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,

“*Washington, D. C. :*

“Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As to this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox-carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled. His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could and would not recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader.

“It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey’s request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship.

“These people only respect force and firmness. I submit with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the native. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a



tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers. \* \* \* \*  
[*Stars as in Senate Document.*]

“THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

“*Brigadier-General U. S. V., Commanding.*

“True copy.

“J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

*Anderson to Aguinaldo, July 21, 1898.*

[*Summary*: Request that passes and other assistance be given to Lieutenant Bryan, on reconnaissance.]

“L. R. No. 138. Received July 22, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, general commanding Philippine forces. No date or place.

“*Brief.* — Objects to United States occupying warehouse No. 1, Calle Colon, as it is the property of a Filipino named Don Antonio Osorio, and is under insurgents’ protection. Requests the removal of same.

“*Action.* — Forwarded to General Merritt July 27 as an enclosure to L. S. No. 45.”

[PAGE 14.]

*Anderson to Aguinaldo, July 27, 1898*

[*Summary*: Letter regarding the property of Don Antonio Osorio has been forwarded to Major-General Merritt.]

[PAGES 17-19.]

“[Telegram.]

“CAMP DEWEY, near Manila, 8-10-'98.

“Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

“*Commanding Filipino Forces, Bacoor:*

“Will your Excellency consent to my occupation of the intrenchment facing Blockhouse No. 14, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon? Our object is to place artillery to destroy the blockhouse. If you consent, please issue necessary orders to-night. I shall highly appreciate a prompt reply.

“THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

“*Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.*

“[Telegram.]

“BACOR, August 10, 1898

“Brig. Gen. THOMAS M. ANDERSON, U. S. V., *Camp Dewey.*

“SIR, — Replying to your note of this date, in which you ask me the occupation by your troops of the intrenchments facing Blockhouse No. 14 only, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon, I have the pleasure to tell you that I [am] giving the necessary orders so that your troops

may occupy the mentioned intrenchments, and my troops will pass to the immediate intrenchments or to any other place where they think convenient to intrench themselves.

“I remain, most respectfully, yours,

“E. AGUINALDO.

“[Telegram.]

“MANILA, P. I., August 13, 1898.

“General AGUINALDO,

“*General in Chief, Filipino Forces:*

“Serious trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your forces should not force themselves into the city until we have received the full surrender. Then we will negotiate with you.

“ANDERSON.

“[Most urgent — Pineda received from Bacoor 10.50 A. M. 13th.]

“*General Aguinaldo, Ermita, president of revolutionary government, to General Anderson, Ermita.*

“I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In consequence of this I have not answered until now. My troops are forced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is necessary to avoid conflict, which I should lament, that you order your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they have conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict respect to American forces and to aid them in case they are attacked by a common enemy.

“I do not doubt that the good relations and friendship which unite us will be continued if your soldiers correspond to the conduct imposed upon mine.

E. AGUINALDO

“[Telegram.]

“BACOOB, August 14, 1898.

“General ANDERSON :

“My troops who have been for so long beseiging Manila, have always been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on account of the many sacrifices made of money and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have given proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Paranaque, Pasay, Cingalon, and Mytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of

the Spaniards, I will commission Don Filepe Buen Camino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines to hold a conference with you, and that they will be safe during the conference.

“ E. AGUINALDO.

“ [Memoranda, without date, in General Anderson’s handwriting.]

“ If you apparently have been treated harshly, it is from military necessity, and not for want of confidence. We had to take Manila to effect the purpose of our war.

“ While we may admit the justice of your insurrection, to prevent all possible complications, still it is thought judicious and necessary to have only one army in Manila at once.

“ [In General Merritt’s handwriting.]

“ The Government of the United States, you may be assured, which [while?] as its agent I can make no promises, will deal fairly with the Filipinos, but we must now insist, for the good of all, that there shall be no joint occupation of Manila.”

“ NOTE. — This is apparently the draft of a telegram sent in reply to General Aguinaldo’s message, dated 10.50 A. M., August 13, and marked ‘Most urgent.’

“ [Telegram.]

“ BACOOR, August 14, 1898.

“ General ANDERSON, *Manila*.

“ DEAR GENERAL: Not being able to leave government, have conferred special powers to Buen Camino, Araneta, and others, who left here for you at 8 o’clock this morning.

“ E. AGUINALDO.

“ From Aguinaldo, Emilio. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., August 15, 1898.

“ *Brief.* — Mis comisionadas me dicen que v ha prometiss enviarme antes el plans del radio que quiren ustedes solos ocupar sin embargo iran alli manana mismo mis comisionados para hacer arreglos despues de los enales vere si conviene la ritirado de mis tropas desersco siempo de conservar la amistad y un a burao intelligencio.

“ [Memorandum.]

“ General Merritt remarks, in relation to the telegrams you sent us, that it would be well to inform General Aguinaldo as follows:

“ We can not permit joint occupation of the city. The city surrendered to the United States forces, and all the headway that you have been able to make was due entirely to the assistance furnished you by the United States. We now hold the city, which includes all the outlying districts of the city properly within the city limits. We most earnestly and sincerely hope and trust that there may be no conflict

between us, but we are prepared to enforce our orders in this matter and expect from time to time large additions to our strength. We desire most sincerely to remain friendly with the Filipinos, and have nothing but their best interests at heart in all our dealings with them.

“ We have given orders to our troops as well as to General Aguinaldo that there shall be no violence whatsoever.

“ NOTE. — Apparently a memorandum prepared for General Anderson by General Babcock.

“ True copy.

“ J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*”

[REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR FOR 1898, PAGE 678.]

[NOTE. — The concluding paragraphs of a letter from Major-General Anderson to the Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C., headed, “ Through Official Channels,” and dated “ Dec. 24, 1898,” are as follows]:

“ I omitted to mention in my first report a matter that has since evolved a question of importance.

“ Major-General Merritt’s demand that Aguinaldo should not permit his insurgent forces to participate in our attack or enter the city had not been regarded, as several thousand armed Filipinos had forced their way into the Paco and Malate suburbs. On the north side of the Pasig River the Spaniards still held their lines and kept out the insurgents from that direction, but on the south side the conditions were critical. The insurgents were excited and hostile, because not only had we not invited them to co-operate, but had tried to prevent them from crossing the Spanish lines. It is even probable that some of the street-firing upon our troops came from the Filipinos who had established themselves in Paco.

“ About 7 o’clock I received a message from the general commanding to get the insurgents out of the city, if I could possibly do so. The best I could do at that time was to segregate the insurgent detachments by interposing our troops and placing artillery to command their positions. It was feared that they would break loose and loot the city. It must be said, however, that they maintained good discipline. I telegraphed General Aguinaldo that night, demanding the withdrawal of his troops. I received an answer that he would send commissioners to meet me the next day. They came the next afternoon, and the negotiations which followed averted, for a time, a conflict between our forces and the insurgent Philippines.

“ Very respectfully,

“ THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

“ *Major-General United States Volunteers,*

“ *Commanding Second Division, August 13, 1898.*”

#### 4. Commander R. B. Bradford, U. S. N.

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 488, 489.]

*From "Statement of Commander R. B. Bradford, U. S. N., October 14, 1898, before the United States Peace Commission at Paris."*

"Q. Now, Commander, as you said something about the moral point of view, you consider that we have a moral duty, unless I misunderstood you, to take the whole of the Philippine Group? — A. That is quite correct.

"Q. I suppose you would recognize that one of the bases of the moral obligation is an adherence to declarations which, from a national standpoint, amount to promises, would you not? — A. Yes, sir, certainly.

"Q. Good morals require adherence? — A. Certainly.

"Q. Having undertaken a war with a specific declaration that it was undertaken with an utter absence of intention to acquire territory, with a definite object defined and declared, and having accomplished that object so defined and declared, would not you believe there is some moral obligation to adhere to that declaration? — A. Nations, as well as individuals, have a right to change their minds.

"Q. Having made in the present war just such a declaration as I have described, and having in the course of that war carried it on as a civilized nation is entitled to carry it on, by striking the enemy wherever we can find him, we struck Spain in her territory in the Philippines, did we not? — A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Now, the war having been accomplished and the declared end in view achieved, are we not pledged morally by the declaration we have made to content ourselves with that achieved object and to relinquish the territory we occupied merely as an act of war? If, for instance, we might have attacked and seized as an act of war the city of Barcelona, on the peninsula, would we not, when we achieved the object of the war, in morality have been bound by the position we took at the outset to abandon Barcelona? — A. No, sir; not by the rules of war.

"Q. I am speaking of the rules of morality now. — A. Nor by the rules of morality either. We had a right to take it, and it is not immoral to keep what is our own. Besides, even when a contract is broken, the law, founded on justice and morality, requires a loss by one party to be shown before damages can be awarded. I do not believe that Spain relaxed her efforts to defeat us on account of the declaration you refer to. Spain, by her oppression and misrule, has lost most of the vast colonial territory she once possessed. History

has applauded those who brought about the separation and inscribed their names among the benefactors of the world.

“ Mr. FRYE.

“ Q. I would like to ask just one question in that line. Suppose the United States in the progress of that war found the leader of the present Philippine rebellion an exile from his country in Hongkong, and sent for him and brought him to the islands in an American ship, and then furnished him 4,000 or 5,000 stands of arms, and allowed him to purchase as many more stands of arms in Hongkong, and accepted his aid in conquering Luzon, what kind of a nation, in the eyes of the world, we would appear to be to surrender Aguinaldo and his insurgents to Spain to be dealt with as they please? — A. We become responsible for everything he has done; he is our ally and we are bound to protect him.


“ The CHAIRMAN.

“ Q. Supposing that co-operation, whether wise or unwise, was limited to the island of Luzon, where the insurrection of the Tagalos, a separate class of people inhabiting the other islands, existed, and we bound the United States in the forum of morals not to leave those people and not to leave a condition of warfare and chaos on that island, if we take that island, compose everybody on that island, great and small and protect them — does not that discharge the moral obligation to the people we have had as so-called allies? — A. I do not think I quite understand the question.

“ Q. (Question repeated.) — A. No, for this reason. During the course of our naval operations at Manila, we destroyed or rendered useless all forces subject to the control of the representative of Spain at the capital of the islands. The power of Spain having become largely paralyzed, the native people of the southern islands have been enabled to practically take charge. We, therefore, are responsible, in a more or less degree, according to the amount of power in Spanish hands before being attacked by us, for what has since taken place in the southern islands and what is taking place there now.

“ Q. We have simply put the inhabitants of the southern islands in a better condition, so far as overcoming the objectionable power of Spain is concerned, than they were before; is not that true? — A. Possibly, if they succeed. But there are interests in southern islands affecting civilized people of different nationalities which have suffered. Again, I doubt very much if any native government is better than the Spanish Government was.

“ Q. There you are getting outside of the moral obligation to relieve them from an oppressive power. — A. I intended to confine myself to the indirect results of our action at Manila.”



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
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1. To inform themselves, as fully and as accurately as possible, as to the true state of affairs in the Philippine Islands.

2. To circulate accurate information, by informal conversation, by inducing others to study the facts collected, and by sending to the Secretary the names of people who may be thought to be interested.

Any one desiring to become a member is asked to send his name and address to L. K. FULLER, 12 Otis Place, Boston.





1871/1872

